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Abstract
Situated within broader contexts of literature on the origin of rule of law, this paper analyzes the
rules of law in Lebanon and Somalia and offers commentary on the relationship between weak
states and the rule of law. Both divided states that succumbed to brutal civil wars, Somalia was
able to foster a strong rule of law whereas Lebanon was not. Rule of law, in this analysis,
requires a common conception of justice and institutions that embody these values. Following
Paul Kahn’s prescription for a cultural study of law, this paper analyzes the emergence of social
consensus and institutional congruence. Lebanon’s topdown imposition of legality precludes
justice by solidifying religious divides and prioritizing elite power over reconciliation, resulting
in a culture of impunity. In comparison, Somalia’s bottomup construction of institutions aligns
with unified religious values that enable rule of law in the absence of a strong centralized
government. This paper concludes bottomup creations of justice are more efficacious than
topdown impositions.
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Introduction
Weak states, defined by their inability to provide adequate resources to their populations,
are commonly considered to be unable to administer justice effectively, resulting in depictions of
lawlessness and disorder.1 Following brutal and total civil wars, Lebanon clutches to a
government barely controlling a fractious society, and Somalia’s government disintegrated and
lacks any control over its territory. The absolute and relative weaknesses of these states are
codified by the Fragile States Index (FSI), which orders 178 states by weakness and fragility.
Somalia ranks the second most fragile state, while Lebanon is the 41st.2 Human Rights and Rule
of Law, which is one component of the aggregate score, is assessed on a scale from 0 to 10, with
0 representing sustainable state structures and 10 absolute fragility. It conceptually makes sense
that Somalia, the quintessential failed state, is unable to administer justice and scores a perfectly
imperfect score of 10.0, and Lebanon, with its stillintact judiciary, a more modest 7.2. However,
these rankings are not indicative of the lived legality in these societies. Burgeoning local courts
in Somalia offer justice and a semblance of rule of law that is absent in Lebanon whose formal
institutions perpetuate a culture of impunity and complete lack of governmental accountability.
Why does Somalia, a failed state, have a stronger rule of law than Lebanon? And generally, why
does the rule of law exist in the absence of a strong state in some cases and not in others?
Despite similar factors contributing to state weakness, Somali and Lebanese rules of law
differ significantly. Inherited judicial structures from colonial powers deteriorated following
independence, and these structures all but disappeared following brutal civil wars. However,
Lebanon has held onto these deteriorating institutions as an attempt to preserve some order and
Rotberg, Robert. “The Failure and Collapse of Nation States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair.” in 
When States
Fail: Causes and Consequences, 
4.
2
Fragile States Index, “Lebanon” and “Somalia,” 

The Fund for Peace
, 2015.
1
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continually prioritizes political stability over justice.3 Selectively ignoring past crimes erodes all
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. In contrast, many Somalis have ignored formal institutions
established with help from international powers. Instead, local judicial initiatives have
flourished, and Somalis widely support traditional clan law, Sharia courts, and their
conflictresolution mechanisms.4 These varied responses to postwar crisis have altered each
state’s rule of law, which are both wrongly represented in rankings. In order to engage in an
analysis of the counterintuitive strengths of rules of law in Lebanon and Somalia, it is first
important to understand the inaccuracy of these rankings, which requires an overview of the
landscape of current rule of law scholarship.
Review of Current Literature
Although rule of law is frequently discussed as the hallmark of a modern state, the
definition of this concept predates modern societies. Greece, as early as the sixth century BC,
entertained discussions on a culture of legality and the idea that, as Aristotle writes, “It is more
6
proper that the law should govern than any of the citizens.”5,
The supremacy of law over human

rule is central to the idea of rule of law. Law, in contrast to specific rules enacted by a
8
government, is a general body of “abstract rules that bind a community together.” 7,
The function

of this abstract body of rules is commonly agreed upon to be twofold: to protect citizens from

International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). “Failing to Deal with the Past: What Cost to Lebanon?”

International Center for Transitional Justice 
(2014),
10.

4
LeSage, Andre. “Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives.” C

enter for
Humanitarian Dialogue 
(2005), 8.
5
May, Christopher. "The Rule of Law: Athenian Antecedents to Contemporary Debates." 

Hague Journal on the
Rule of Law
4, no. 02 (2012), 236.
6
Hayek, Frederick A. 

The Constitution of Liberty. C
hicago: 1960, 165.
7
Raz, Joseph. “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” in 
Liberty and the Rule of Law 
ed. Robert L. Cunningham. 1979, 6.
8
Fukuyama, Francis. 

The Origins of Political Order. New York: 2
011,
246.
3
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10 ,11,12
arbitrary rule and to protect citizens from each other and the Hobbesian “state of nature.”9,


However, these basic functions are some of only a few aspects on which all rule of law scholars
can agree.
Disagreements center on defining the essential components of rule of law—whether it is
a means or an end. Some argue rule of law is a means—a set of procedures that determine how
justice is administered, while others argue rule of law requires a defined end—a substantive
definition of justice. Procedural law scholars highlight how law works and argue rule of law
requires laws that are accessible, clear, widely known, and universally enforced, ideally by an
independent and efficient judiciary.13 These procedures, according to Joseph Raz, allow the
essence of rule of law, which is that it “be capable of guiding the behavior of its subjects.”14
Raz’s definition conforms to common principles of rule of law by precluding arbitrary
governance because without clearly defined laws, citizens’ are incapable of predicting how a
government will respond to a certain action.
In contrast, scholars promoting substantive law

argue the procedures of an effective legal system are not inherently desirable unless they are
promoting or protecting some value.15 Thus, they prescribe an end goal for law, which
necessitates valuations on ideal justice and, as Randall Peerenboom asserts, requires analyzing
17
the specific cultural and social context within which the assertions are being made.16,
It is right,

edner, Adriaan. “An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law.” 
B
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2010), 50.
Raz, “Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” 12.

11
Carlin, Ryan. “Rule of Law Typologies in Contemporary Societies” J

ustice System Journal 
(2012), 155
12
KleinfeldBelton, Rachel. “Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners.” 3

13
Tamanaha, Brian. “The History and Elements of the Rule of Law,” 

Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
2012, 233.
14
Ibid., 233.

15
KleinfeldBelton, Rachel. “Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners,” 3.
16
Peerenboom, Randall. “Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion.” 
Asian Discourses
of Rule of Law 
(2004), 9.
17
KleinfeldBelton, "Competing definitions of the rule of law,” 3.

9

10
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therefore, to refer to 
a
rule of law rather than 
the 
rule of law to capture the different conceptions
of justice operating in different societies.
To account for different manifestations of law, scholars have studied the origin of rules of
law. Some scholars assert a consensus of legality arose prior to the codification of laws, while
others advocate the exact opposite: that law meant to protect elite power and only later was
distributed among the general populace. Rule of law is a “social institution” that defines
19
interactions and expectations among the population.18 ,
Thus, the former theory, posited by

Frederick Hayek, asserts social consensus and law develops “spontaneously” as localities
experiment with different modes of interaction, with the most effective methods evolving into
broader norms that are later codified.20 The origin of Western European rule of law and English
Common Law in particular supports spontaneity.21 As an example, Bruce Benson chronicles the
advent of European commercial law through the interactions between international law
merchants in the Middle Ages. These merchants required contracts to facilitate their economic
transactions, which frequently differed among disparate localities. However, common codes
among localities coalesced in the community of traders to create standardized interactions.
European governments later enacted these codes into law, creating commercial law that was
“voluntarily produced, voluntarily adjudicated, and voluntarily enforced.”22 Thus, rule of law

18

May, “Athenian Antecedents,” 241.
Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. 

Law in Modern Society
.
Simon and Schuster
, 1977, 
49.
20
Fukuyama, Francis. 
The Origins of Political Order. New York: 2
011,
253.

21
Hayek, 
Constitution of Liberty, 
199.
22
Benson, Bruce L. “Justice without Government: The Merchant Courts of Medieval Europe and Their Modern
Counterparts” in 
The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society, e
dited by David Beito et. al. University
of Michigan Press, 2002, 128, 131.
19
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predated modern European states and originated through the voluntary adoption of common
modes of interaction. 23
In opposition to this bottomup creation of legality, others posit law requires a centralized
authority. Francis Fukuyama asserts Hayek’s argument for spontaneity is historically flawed
because centralized governments altered, enacted, and enforced legality, and without this
intervention, rule of law in these societies would not exist.24 Luigi Ferrajoli agrees in the
necessity of authoritative articulation of law, asserting law is “wholly an artificial object
‘posited’ or ‘produced’ by human beings and thus dependent on their responsibility, on how they
consider, draft, produce, interpret, and apply it.”25 In order for law to control powerful actors, it
must be capable of restraining powerful elites who must view law as legitimate.26 Thus,
Fukuyama argues, the government initially applies protections from arbitrariness to elites only in
order to coopt their support.27 In states with strong rules of law, these protections are only later
expanded to include the general population. Additionally, the professionalization of judges
concentrates legal power among elites who then use legal apparati to ensure their interests and
agenda.28 Thus, Brian Tamanaha characterizes law as “spoils that go to the winners,” and the
losers in these battles comply only for hope they may one day “take their turn to wield the law.”
29

Studying the origin of the rule of law has been important to understand its different

manifestations; however, research must expand to increase its analysis.

ukuyama, Francis. "Transitions to the Rule of Law." 
F
Journal of Democracy 
21, no. 1 (2010), 36.
Fukuyama, 
The Origins of Political Order, 
253.
25
Ferrajoli, Luigi. "The Past and the Future of the Rule of Law." In 

The Rule of Law History, Theory and Criticism
,
edited by Pietro Costa, Houten: Springer, 2007, 
331.
26
Fukuyama, 
The Origins of Political Order, 
247.
27
Ibid., 250.
28
Tamanaha, Brian Z. 

On the rule of law: History, politics, theory
. Cambridge University Press, 2004,
137.
29
Tamanaha, “History and Elements of Rule of Law, ” 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies. (2012), 
225.
23
24
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Rule of law scholarship currently lacks a robust analysis of nonWestern trajectories. The
largest body of nonWestern analysis concerns the differences in the emergence, or lack thereof,
31 ,32 ,33
of rule of law in India and China, respectively.30,
China developed into a strong, centralized

state absent the rule of law, while India has failed to develop a strong state even given its robust
conception of rule of law.34 Analyzing these states, Fukuyama asserts religion plays a central role
in the formation of an abstract conception of legality by placing a divine restriction on rulers.
The advent of religion in India prevented accumulation of power and creation of a strong state,
while the absence of a strong Chinese religious tradition allowed the state to accumulate power
36
unhindered by religious elites.35,
In addition to restricting state power, religion provides an

articulated and universal conception of legality that followers voluntarily adopt. While this
consensus supports the bottomup origin of rule of law, Fukuyama maintains religion’s structure
and level of institutionalization are vital for the state adoption of legality. For example, Indian
Brahmins lacked the strict hierarchy and political power characteristic of the Catholic Church.37
The Church’s power was ultimately responsible for the widespread adoption and codification of
legality in Western European societies. The interplay between bottomup and topdown origins
of law is important for future study especially in regards to legal development.
The absence of robust comparative analysis on rules of law and the failure to
acknowledge the heterogeneity of relationships between rule of law and state strength
Peerenboom, Randall. “Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion.” 
Asian Discourses
of Rule of Law 
(2004).
31
Unger, Roberto Mangabeira.

Law in Modern Society
,
49.
32
Ocko, Jonathan and David Gilmartin. “State, Sovereignty, and the People: A Comparison of the ‘Rule of Law’ in

China and India.” 
The Journal of Asian Studies. vol 68 no 1 (2009).
33
Fukuyama, 

The Origins of Political Order.
34
Unger, 
Law in Modern Society, 
87.
35
Fukuyama, “Transitions to Rule of Law” 43.
36
Peerenboom, “Varieties of Rule of Law,” 1.
37
Fukuyama, 
The Origins of Political Order,
277.
30
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complicates the analysis and development of rules of law. In current development discourse, a
39
strong rule of law becomes a metric for a strong, modern state.38 ,
Thus, rule of law is

frequently cited as a panacea for weak states. However, definitions of rule of law impact the
pursuit of development. Focusing on only institutions and procedures can, as Raz concedes,
legitimize a wide array of regimes including repressive colonialism and apartheid.40 However,
focusing only on developing substantive rule of law, as development scholarship is currently
dominated by Western conceptions, furthers “economic, cultural, political, and legal hegemony.”
41 ,42

Without taking into account differing justices and public acceptance of norms, the imposition

of Western legal procedures, themselves based on imperfect systems, “can have no effect but to
44
destroy the respect for [these institutions] even where they deserve it.”43,

The ineffectiveness of


these reforms arise from an inability, or unwillingness, to adequately understand the multiplicity
of rules of law in existence. A major reason for this gap in scholarship is the lack of robust
comparative work on the origins of rules of law.

Framing the Paper
Both Lebanon and Somalia are weak states, and analysis of their rules of law, if done at
all, commonly conform to dominant development discourses. This paper seeks to fill the gap in
current literature by providing a comparative analysis of rules of law in Lebanon and Somalia

Peerenboom, Randall. “Rule of Law in China and India: A HistoricalCultural Approach” in 
Commentaries of
Ocko and Gilmartin: 
112.
39
Ezrow, Natasha M. and Erica Frantz. “Judicial Institutions,” in 
Failed States and Institutional Decay:
Understanding Instability and Poverty in the Developing World 
(New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 132.
40
Peerenboom, “Varieties of Rule of Law,” 36.
41
Carothers, Thomas. “The Rule of Law Revival” in 
Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge,
5.
42
Peerenboom, “Varieties of Rule of Law,” 4.
43
Kleinfeld
Belton, "Competing definitions of the rule of law,” 
19.
44
Hayek, 
The Constitution of Liberty, 
219.
38
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disconnected from development goals. Believing procedural law is not inherently valuable, this
paper views rule of law as a means to an end, generally defined as justice, but this end goal is
socially constructed within the context it operates. In order to effectively analyze the
achievement or failure of justice, this paper uses Paul Kahn, a law professor at Yale specializing
in international human rights and cultural theory, as a guide. He prescribes a method for a
cultural study of law that focuses on uncovering the cultural significance of law for specific
communities. To do this, he requires distancing one’s own beliefs to avoid normative valuations
on what rule of law 
should
be. Rather, he asserts, rule of law is “a distribution of power that
works to sustain the conditions of belief that are constitutive of the unity of the nation as a single
community.”45 In order for rule of law to effectively rule, there must be “a reasonable
congruence” between a culture’s values and the legal order.46 Thus, this paper assesses rule of
law in Lebanon and Somalia by whether there is an articulated national consensus on identity
and justice—referred to as social consensus—and whether institutions embody this
ideal—known as institutional congruence.
Lebanon and Somalia animate the discussion on the alternative frameworks for the rule
of law, as these guide the differing trajectories of rule of law in each state. Lebanese law is
imposed on its population through institutions that are increasingly disconnected from reality.
Rigid structures solidify societal divisions, and the topdown imposition of law prevents the
formation of social consensus. Furthermore, these institutions work to cement elite power,
further removing these institutions from their societies and preventing institutional congruence.
In contrast, Somalia has a rule of law due to the bottomup creation of institutions that are part
Kahn, Paul W. 

The Cultural Study of Law: reconstructing legal scholarship
. University of Chicago Press, 2000,
113,
46
Ibid.

, 103.
45
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and parcel of the communities in which they operate. These institutions draw on unified values
and provide social order unhindered by centralized government. Thus, this paper argues rule of
law exists in weak states when it is realized spontaneously rather than imposed by elites.
To account for the absence of rule of law in Lebanon and a burgeoning rule of law in
Somalia, this paper traces the topdown imposition of legal principles in Lebanon and the
bottomup realization of social consensus in Somalia. This paper first establishes the decimation
of rule of law through civil war and state crisis, which provides the arena for the rebuilding of
justice in each state.47 Next, this paper defines identity by analyzing Lebanon’s unsuccessful
articulation of social consensus compared to Somalia’s successful rendering of unified values.
This paper then analyzes the importance of accountable institutions to foster rule of law. Finally,
this paper concludes in the importance of substantive law rather than just procedural law.

Background: Civil War and State Crisis
First, it is necessary to chronicle the Lebanese and Somali civil wars because their
atrocities abolished any semblance of rule of law. These civil wars decimated society, and inept
institutions faced the challenge of rebuilding the state. These wars are certainly not the origin of
state weakness nor does the total destruction present an unhindered opportunity to rebuild
society. Rather, these conflicts uncover underlying weaknesses, and their legacies pervade
government institutions and citizens’ memories. The atrocities committed during the civil wars
shape the landscape and identity of both states.

Lebanon and Somalia are not unitary states, and this paper focuses on rule of law in Lebanon as a whole but

confines its analysis in Somalia to the southern region. While the Lebanese government still claims control over the
entire territory, Somaliland and Puntland are separated from the south by selfdeclarations of independence and
autonomy, respectively.
47
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Lebanon
Internal instability exploited by international powers characterizes the Lebanese civil
war. Originating with colonial manipulation of different communities to suppress competitions
for power, Lebanese communities have had extensive ties to external powers. Since gaining
independence in 1943, Lebanon has repeatedly arbitrated conflicts between disparate
communities in the context of regional conflicts. Situated between Israel and Syria, Lebanon
became the locus for the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, which destabilized its fragile balance of
power between communities.48 Beginning on April 13, 1975, an attack on Palestinian refugees
expanded to include other armed groups in the area factionalized by community ties and
religious affiliations.49 Syria and Israel intervened and specifically exploited internal divisions
especially along Christian and Muslim divisions, which “played a catalytic role” in the further
destabilization of Lebanon’s already divided society.50 After the army factionalized, the war
disintegrated into “little wars” between sectarian communities outfitted with their own militias.51
This conflict deteriorated into “appalling savagery” as “the clan and extended family [were] now
armed to the teeth and caught in the grip of sectarian hysteria.” 52 The war did not end until 1989
with the ratification of the Ta’if Accord, which was overseen by the US and Syria.53 Although
the war collapsed the state, the government “emerged from its ordeal still unified, with one

Picard, Elizabeth. 

Lebanon, a Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the wars in Lebanon
. Holmes & Meier
Pub, 2002,
85.

49
Kurtulus, Ersun N. "Exploring the Paradoxical Consequences of State Collapse: the cases of Somalia 1991–2006

and Lebanon 1975–82." 
Third World Quarterly
33, no. 7 (2012), 
1291.
50
Picard, 
Lebanon, a Shattered Country
, 90. 134.
51
Ibid.,

107.

52
Khalidi, Walid. 

Conflict and violence in Lebanon: confrontation in the Middle East
. Vol. 38. Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979.
48.
53
Ghosn and Khoury. "Lebanon after the civil war,” 

383.
48
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central government, one parliament for one people, and all the formal attributes of a sovereign
(yet nonindependent) state on an undivided (although occupied) territory.”54
Somalia
Similar to Lebanon, the Somali war and state crisis encompassed the entire state and
revealed the volatility of its clan relations. Following its independence from Britain, Italy, and
France in 1960, Somalia was dominated by a single party whose rule was “a rarefied game with
little relevance to the daily challenges facing the population.”55 Thus, citizens widely welcomed
General Mohamed Siad Barre’s bloodless coup in October, 1969.56 Despite the initial successes
of Siad Barre’s Supreme Revolutionary Council including codification of a written Somali
language, a massive literacy campaign, and promises of unifying Somalia’s various clans, Siad
Barre manipulated clan loyalties to consolidate his rule, which proved tenuous.57 As his hold on
power deteriorated, Siad Barre sought “clan scapegoats,” but soon resistance spread throughout
59
Somalia eventually reducing Siad Barre to the “Mayor of Mogadishu.”58 ,
On January 27, 1991,

the United Somali Congress (USC) drove Siad Barre out of power, but similar to Lebanon, the
contest to fill his vacancy led to militia fighting organized by clan identity. The USC itself
succumbed to subclan conflicts, which prevented the emergence of any unified national
government.60 Somalia’s government collapsed, and, unlike Lebanon, the state failed to function
at all.

agher, Carole H., and Paul Kingston.
D
Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon's PostWar Challenge
, (2001), 
3.
Lyons, Terrence, and Ahmed Ismail Samatar. 

Somalia: State collapse, multilateral intervention, and strategies for
political reconstruction
. Brookings Institution Press, 1995, 14
.
56
Harper, Mary. 

Getting Somalia Wrong: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered (
2012), 
54.
57
Lyons and Samatar, “Somalia: State Collapse,” 14.

58
Ibid., 15, 17.
59
Harper, 

Getting Somalia Wrong, 
56.
60
Ibid., 57.
54

55
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Moving Forward
These wars physically and psychologically destroyed Lebanon and Somalia. In Lebanon,
one in every thirty people died, and most were civilians.61 Those who did not lose their lives
faced disease, starvation, and psychological trauma, as “all witnessed or were victims of
bombing, assault, torture, or extortion.”62 Statistics on Somali casualties remain unknown
because violence continues and thwarts recordkeeping. However, hundreds of thousands of
Somalis were killed from the “manmade” famine resulting from the destruction of livestock and
64
land, and millions remain affected by continued famine and disease.63,
Terrence Lyons

characterizes the collapsed state as a time when “the Somali people suffered the horrible brutality
of living in a Hobbesian world without law or institutions to regulate relations among groups or
to protect the most vulnerable from the most vicious.”65 These atrocities have lasting impacts.
These wars consumed every aspect of Lebanese and Somali societies and destroyed not
only trust in the government but also trust between citizens. The utter lawlessness of these wars
shattered any conception of justice and thus any semblance of rule of law. In addition to
rebuilding infrastructure and institutions, Lebanese and Somali governments must reconstitute
their societies. The physical destruction of the state and society is matched with the
psychological terror of pitting neighbors against neighbors. Due to the totality of destruction,
postwar Lebanon and Somalia provide fertile ground for studying the origin of legality and
assessing how Somalia was able to achieve rule of law, while Lebanon was not. Following

Picard, 
Lebanon, a Shattered Country
, 145.
Ibid., 145.
63
Lyons and Samatar, “Somalia: State Collapse,” 7. 

Harper, 
Getting Somalia Wrong,
59.
64
Menkhaus, Ken. "Governance without government in Somalia: spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping."

(2007), 
81.
65
Lyons and Samatar, “Somalia: State Collapse,” 7.

61
62
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Kahn’s framework, in order for law to represent commonly held beliefs, a state must define and
unify its citizens. The following discussion traces the factors contributing to Lebanon’s failure
and Somalia’s success in articulating a national consensus.

Social Consensus
Rebuilding societal consensus represents one of the most difficult hurdles in postconflict
environments, but also one of the most important for the establishment of the rule of law. The
rule of law is not obeying rules for fear of outright punishment, but rather voluntarily complying
with rules because they conform to an individual’s sense of justice.66 Universal application of
legal codes requires the merging of law and ethics across the population—creating a unified
community.67 In order to determine whether a social consensus exists, it is important to explore a
state’s articulation of identity and justice. Defining justice for Lebanon and Somalia is certainly
beyond the scope of this paper, so cooperation among citizens will be used as an indicator of
consensus. This paper assumes cooperation arises from shared goals; thus, high levels of
cooperation would indicate either numerous shared goals or few deeply held goals.
For Lebanon and Somalia, it is important to look at the role of religion because, as
Fukuyama asserts, religion offers a unified conception of morality and creates community
consensus. However, religion plays opposing roles in these states. Both societies are deeply
divided, and religious identity frustrates the articulation of a national consensus in Lebanon
while it serves to unite all Somalis. Religion entrenches cultural differences among Lebanese
sects and precludes national consensus by inhibiting crosscultural dialogue. In contrast, Islam in

66
67

Fukuyama, 
Origins of Political Order, 
260.
Ferrajoli,. "The Past and the Future of the Rule of Law," 

325.
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Somalia merges with traditional clan law and provides a unifying connection and consensus
between differing clan identities.

Lebanon
Similar to the emergence of unified rules among law merchants, Lebanese society
originated with codes of conduct locally specific to religious communities. Lebanon is a nation
defined by its religious communities. Thus, similar to other weak states, the challenge for
Lebanon is the creation of a national consensus that eschews purely ethnic and religious
conceptions of nationalism.68 
Concurrent with the emergence of European commercial law,

similarities among locally specific codes of conduct were unified into a general body of rules
forming a consensus of behavior. However, this consensus across communities failed to emerge
in Lebanon because the government institutionalized religious pluralism in lieu of forging a
unified social consensus.
Based on Lebanon’s commitment to religious freedom, the state defined religious
communities, rather than individuals, as the basic unit of society. Lebanon is composed of
eighteen officially recognized religious communities, which form the basis of societal
organization.69 Lebanon has long been a refuge for religious minorities and enshrines religious
freedom in its 1926 Constitution.70 The coexistence of each of these communities was a
hallmark of early Lebanese identity, and Pope John Paul II remarks, “Lebanon is more than a
country; it is a message,” signifying the importance of Lebanon’s multiconfessional identity.71

68

Ezrow and Frantz, “Judicial Institutions,” 57.
CIA, “Lebanon,” 
The World FactBook.
70
Human Rights Watch, “Unequal and Unprotected: Women’s Rights Under Lebanese Personal Status Laws”,
Human Rights Watch
, 2015, 19.
71
Dagher, 
Bring Down the Walls, ,
7, 29.
69
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In order for each community to freely practice their faiths, the government granted significant
levels of autonomy allowing each sect to establish its own religious courts and schools.72 The
Lebanese state, in tune with its liberalism and laissezfaire governance of the economy and
society, allowed each community unfettered control of its internal affairs. 7374 This communal
individualism created locally specific legal codes; however, due to the lack of oversight of these
religious courts, the state was unable to unify legality across communities.75 The primacy of
religion and its lack of national coherence makes Lebanon a “federation of communities”
77
without any unifying values.76 ,
Paradoxically, what originally began as the essential component

of Lebanese identity—religious freedom—has now prevented the emergence of a unified
Lebanese identity.
In addition to the administrative separation between these communities, differing
interests supported by external factors strengthen the animosity between communities. Because
Lebanon serves as a refuge for religious minorities, each community seeks desperately to
preserve its distinct identity and to avoid assimilation of any kind by remaining separate from
other sects.78 These separations were rarefied by colonial exploitation of these communities as
European powers sought ties to assert their control once the Ottoman Empire collapsed, which
provided each community its own benefactor.79 Connections to and privileging of external actors
destabilized domestic politics. Furthermore, because the civil war was internationalized,

72

Human Rights Watch, “Unequal and Unprotected,” 28.
Kurtulus,"Exploring the Paradoxical Consequences of State Collapse,” 
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Dagher, 
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connections to outside powers often defined one’s enemies—Syrianoriented Muslim sects
fought viciously against Christian sects and vice versa.80 The international and sectarian
character of the civil war continued the exploitation of identities and Lebanon was “reduced to
cantons surrounded by unknown hostile areas.”81 Following the sectarian violence of the civil
war, communities once again sought refuge—withdrawing to “confessional ghettos” or “isolated
cultural islands.”82 Due to the autonomy and isolation awarded to these communities, there was
no need to construct a dialogue between sects. Each community, equipped with its own schools,
was allowed to construct its own historical narrative and memory of the war—inhibiting national
reconciliation and general knowledge about “the other.” 83 Communal animosities become the
hallmark of the Lebanese state as they are enshrined within the very structure of government.

Confessionalism: Entrenching Separation
In order to balance community autonomy with national unity, Lebanon’s government
grants representation based on communal identity, which serves as the basis of all political
interactions. The National Pact of 1943 established Confessionalism and allocated political
power based on religious affiliation “provided such measures will not harm the general welfare
85
of the state.”84 ,
The Pact split political authority by requiring a Maronite president and

commanderinchief, a Sunni prime minister, a Shi’a parliamentary president, a Greek Orthodox
vice president, and a proportionally represented parliament with a quota of six Christians for
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every five Muslims.86 Confessionalism was thought to balance competing interests, which was
especially compelling following the war. Thus, the system was renewed with the 1990 Ta’if
Accord, which was “meant to compel each group to assume its share in the shaping of the future
and to get rid of the ‘victim syndrome’ or the ‘conspiracy theory’ [of the civil war] entrenched in
Lebanese mentality.”87 Confessionalism, at its core, is designed to honor and preserve the myriad
of Lebanese communities, though it actually entrenches disparate interests and prevents any
substantial cooperation between sects.
Unfortunately, Confessionalism, rather than unifying communities, discourages
compromise by incentivizing the pursuit of power for a single sect. For plural societies to work,
there must be a balance between particular conceptions of justice for each community as well as
universal rights to forge cooperation between communities.88 However, as previously discussed,
there is no unified consensus. Thus, Confessionalism “prevented the development among the
citizenry of a Lebanese national consciousness, for one owed loyalty not to the nation, but to
one’s religious community and to its spokesmen within the government.”89 This then precluded
any sort of debate over divisive issues such as a unified Lebanese identity and heightened the
insular and particular nature of Confessional culture as representatives of each sect were
attempting to promote their own version of the good and define their own version of “Lebanese.”
90 ,91
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each community has a vested interest in perpetuating Confessionalism and its source of access to
state resources.
Confessionalism rewards clientelistic relationships, which causes civil society to maintain
religious affiliations preventing cooperation. Clientelism ensures communities, not individuals,
are the primary actors within the state.92 This clientelistic system rewards actors that offer
political benefit to specific communities. Thus, civil society organizations have oriented
themselves to work within the sectarian political climate, often explicitly advertising their
religious orientation.93 Even the multitude of organizations demanding accountability from the
war are religiously organized. For example, groups demanding inquiries into missing family
members are divided between Muslim and Christian identities due to the sectarian application of
crimes during the war.94 Thus, civil organizations do not bridge communal affiliations and serve
96
only to continue clientelism and erode the government’s pursuit of a common good.95 ,
Lebanon

is characterized by limited crosscultural cooperation, which is not the case in Somalia even
though clans offer a similarly divisive social arrangement.

Somalia
Similar to religious affiliation in Lebanon, clan identity in Somalia guides social
interactions. Clan relations, cited as cause of the dysfunction of Somali society, commonly
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define Somalia as a “prenation state of isolated communities,” which resembles Lebanese
society.97 However divisive clan relations may be, these individual networks have interacted
through forums offering dialogue and consensus through traditional clan practices and Islamic
beliefs. These modes of interaction formulate a social consensus absent Lebanon’s
institutionalization of difference.
Clan identities are comprehensive and define the prism through which social organization
is viewed. All Somalis belong to one of six clan families—Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Daarood, Digil,
and Rahanweyn—which trace back generations to a common ancestor. These clan families are
then broken up into clans, subclans, primary lineages, and 
diya
paying groups, with alliances
and animosities shifting frequently.98 Although alliances shift, the actual genealogies are
permanent, with youth learning to recite their ancestors back twenty generations.99 In the intense
competition for resources among nomads and pastoralists, clan affiliations determined the threat
of an approaching individual; so strong are animosities that the failure to recount one’s ancestors
101
can result in death, and members of rival clans “[kill] each other with abandon.” 100 ,
Siad Barre

identified clan identities as inimical to modern society. However, his manipulation of clan
affiliations to rule exacerbated animosities and partially prevented clans from uniting following
his collapse.102 Similar to Lebanon, the absence of a united morality during and after Siad Barre’s
regime led Somalis to rely even more upon clan networks especially in organizing militias and
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competing for resources.103 Clan competition absent morality caused
“ruinous clanism
unmitigated by kinship and mutual obligation, which gets more bizarre and destructive as the
underlying society fails to produce a new and sustainable cultural foundation.”104 However,
Somalia is able to transcend this discord through traditional dialogue.
Although deeply ingrained clan animosities would appear to preclude any consensus
across clans, traditional clan law offers uniform norms regulating behavior between clans. The
nomadic nature of Somali societies forces interactions between clans and necessitates a method
for arbitrating disputes, which is informally codified through 
xeer
, traditional clan law. Although
the application of 
xeer 
varies across Somalia, essential elements are uniform across localities,
very similar to the law merchants.105 
Xeer
establishes a social contract “defining the terms of
their collective unity.” 106 The competition for resources and the previously discussed violence
between clans led to principles of interaction; 
xeer 
certainly did not eliminate conflict, but it did
108
provide accepted standards for dealing with disputes.107 ,
Most notable to this discussion is the

payment of 
diya
—blood compensation—between clans.109 An elder, mutually agreed upon by
the two clans, presides over a court, whereby a payment is decided in congruence with the injury
that is to be paid by all members of the 
diya
paying subgroup of a clan.110 These court
proceedings not only mitigate disagreements between clans, they also demonstrate a source of
common respect for law.
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The collective responsibility among
diya
paying groups as well as the formal structure of
mediation has led many to romanticize 
xeer
as a truly just process.111 However, 
xeer 
often
requires negotiation with dominant clans exerting influence for more favorable outcomes.112
Thus, justice is “the interest of the stronger.”113 Even if 
xeer 
evades equitable justice, it still
offers a forum for the articulation and practice of common interclan practices, a parallel of
which Lebanon lacks. Furthermore, even with power disparities between clans,
rulings can offer

some justice. As previously mentioned, Tamanaha asserts weaker groups can comply with
unequal legal codes voluntarily because they may want to maintain the structures in hopes they
will be able to one day “take their turn to wield the law.” Even if this argument is unconvincing,
Somalis remain united through their common religion.
Islam presents a more prevalent source of consensus, and provides a legal authority over
xeer 
principles and a common moral code.
Somalis are predominantly Muslim and are “firmly

attached” to their faith.114 The “twin pillars” of Somali tradition, 
xeer 
and Islam, fused in a
“symbiotic relationship” indelibly ingraining Islam into traditional clan practices.115 Even among
intense clan animosities, Islam still provides a base of consensus that some assert is a more
ubiquitous aspect of their identity than clan affiliations.116 This sentiment is highlighted by the
fact that each clan family traces their ancestry to the founder of Arabian Islam, who supersedes
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each clanfamily’s common ancestor.117 Islam’s role in Somali society supports Fukuyama’s
assertion of the role of religion in origins of rule of law by “infusing new moral language into
the culture and requiring all believers to see one another as members of a large fraternity,
committed to doing and earning good in this world to secure salvation in the next life.”118 The
promotion of a consensus of justice and a restriction on courts is evidenced by a Somali adage:
“To dispute the judgement of a court is to dispute with God.”119 Islam is a common tie between
all clans, and, unfortunately, Lebanon lacks a parallel.
The existence of a general consensus has important impacts on society by fostering levels
of trust between citizens. One notable example of this trust is the prosperity of the Somali
economy following the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime. State structures remain impoverished
and militiarule strong, though economic interactions do not entirely conform to images of
121
lawless looting and coercive bargaining.120 ,
Even Somali pirates, needing a market to sell their

stolen goods, require a certain level of structure in order to profit from their crimes.122 Similar to
the law merchants, livestock traders have historically negotiated contracts without regulation by
the state and continue to do so following the collapse of the central government.123 The ability for
Somali civil society to fill the vacuum of state failure has built a prosperous economy especially
compared to the economy under Siad Barre but also compared to neighboring states during the
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same time period.124 This economic vitality requires trust and reciprocity.125 In the words of
one
Somali businessman,
“Trust is the secret of the success of the Somalis. Also, Somalis are amazingly
energetic and dynamic. Because of the war in Somalia, there is no central
government, there are no institutions to help people, so everybody has to do their
own thing, you have to depend on yourself. Everybody has relatives who are
suffering, so everyone feels responsible for doing things for other people.”126
This quote highlights the important difference between Somalia and Lebanon. Both states are
extremely divided by religious or clan affiliations. However, absent a centralized government,
Somalis are able to draw on shared Muslim values to cooperate with economic endeavors as well
as establishing legal structures, which will be discussed below. In contrast, the Lebanese
government, with the purpose of ensuring the autonomy of its religious groups, solidified
communal differences and the clientelism of Confessionalism precludes crosscommunity
cooperation.
Identity and institutions complexly intertwine, and the following discussion depicts
institutions and their roles in fostering or hindering the rule of law.

Institutional Congruence
Institutions articulate and administer law, and thus, for a state to have a strong rule of
law, Kahn requires a “reasonable congruence” between a culture’s values and its legal order.
Other theorists support this supposition but use terms such as “ownership” of institutions. How
to achieve ownership and who achieves it are important questions to ask when assessing rules of
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law.127 The above discussion about the origins of rule of law provide a framework to answer
these questions. Lebanon and Somalia present alternative constructions of institutions. Because
the Lebanese government survived the war, Lebanon institutions reasserted their control
“inorganically” via topdown methods. In contrast, Somalia had no centralized government, and
thus its institutions were “organically” realized, manifesting themselves from the bottomup.128
This intrinsically does not matter as imposed or realized institutions can be accountable as long
130
as they reflect citizens’ interests129 ,

Scholars have theorized the failure of institutions to match their societies. This process,
labelled “political decay” by Fukuyama or “judicial corrosion” by John Kleinig, is the result of
132
institutional rigidity and the failure to match citizens’ expectations.131,
Following the war,

Lebanese sought to maintain political unity by forgoing reconciliation efforts and instating elites
into the government. Without reconciliation, the Lebanese government failed to represent
popular interests. In contrast, Somali institutions were constructed within specific localities, and
were thus very responsive to local needs. This next section investigates the contributing factors
of institutional decay and accountability.
Lebanon

This paper has already established Lebanon lacks social consensus in large part due to the
solidification of communal differences within the Confessional political system. Absent any
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social consensus and thus substantive purpose of legality, Lebanese institutions resemble
procedural law only. These procedural institutions support a regime of elite control and benefit.
However, this alone does not preclude Lebanon from rule of law. As Fukuyama asserts, rule of
law often begins by assuring elites protections from government power, which is later
democratized to the whole population.133 However, elite control of Lebanese institutions actively
suppresses justice and precludes any congruence of consensus through the politically expedient,
though socially harmful, practice of ignoring past and present injustice. This ignorance is
procedurally legislated. However, this procedural law erodes substantive justice and the rule of
law by placing political unity above law and specifically by valuing the maintenance of elite
power over citizen justice.
Following the war, the government prioritized institutional unity above reconciliation,
and the resulting institutional denial of responsibility for the war prevents any reconciliation
among the populace. Because the war subsumed the entire country, attempts to hold people
accountable would necessarily involve trials against many government officials. In order to
avoid this destabilization, the government passed a law in 1991 granting amnesty for all crimes
committed before March 1991.134 The purpose was to assert that in the war, there was “no victor
and no vanquished” and to provide a “clean slate” for people to forgive and move forward.135
Just as Confessionalism hindered its designed purpose of religious equality, general amnesty
violated any semblance of social unity. Other than “amnesia,” the government failed to propose a
national reconciliation strategy, and even today there remains no unified narrative of the war,
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with history books ending with independence in 1943. 136 Thus, all healing and reconciliation
resides within specific communities. Due to cultural separation previously discussed, these
personal narratives centralize one’s own sect and “otherize” all others—failing to acknowledge
any common experiences with other communities.137 A 2009 survey found communities blame
others for the war and do not take personal responsibility, which demonstrates that the
government’s calls for unified guilt were unsuccessful and have lasting implications.138 Thus, the
Amnesty Law encouraged the perpetuation of a divisive narrative between communities.
Although the government declared the war was equally devastating to all, incorporation
of militia leaders into the government and unequal application of the Amnesty law bestows
victory on the elites and vanquishes public justice. Government institutions did survive the war,
but they were surely not powerful enough to assert control over the divisive, destroyed society.
Thus, the government sought to coopt militia leaders by giving them government positions;
“Warlords thus became Statelords.”139 Now, people responsible for war crimes and crimes
against humanity are allowed to “parade around the corridors of power in civilian clothes” with
complete impunity.140 Rule of law, at its core, is subjecting government officials to the authority
of the law. Thus, pardoning the crimes of those in power certainly precludes justice.
Even focusing on the procedural aspect of the law—it was created and passed by the
legislature—contradicts the rule of law because this law was selectively applied. The South
Lebanese Army, considered an Israeli proxy, and individuals uncooperative with the postwar
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regime were exempt from the Amnesty Law.141 This selectivity served explicit political purposes
defined by the needs of elites in power; immunity was not granted for assassinations of religious
and political leaders, yet perpetrators of war crimes were pardoned and the fate of the missing
was never seriously pursued by the government.142 Thus, “Amnesty protected the lives of leaders
but not the victims of their crimes,” and this was justified to avoid instability.143 Elite impunity
predicates the entire reconstruction of the state, and remains a touchstone of Lebanese politics as
amnesia is repeatedly asserted after crises posing threats to political stability.
Increasingly separated from citizens and reality, elites in power cling to the institutions to
maintain their power. Recognizing the deleterious impacts of sectarian politics, the Ta’if
Agreement, which formally ended the civil war, proscribed the abolishment of Confessionalism
as a “fundamental national objective” to be replaced by a system of equal power sharing between
145
Christians and Muslims without reference to particular sects.144 ,
However, there have been no

moves to abolish Confessionalism even as institutional ineptitude—due to decades of
“communitarianism [taking] precedence over that of competence”—becomes clear.146
Outsourcing justice to the UN Special Tribunal for the investigation into the 2005 assassination
of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri paired with “de facto amnesties” from the failure to prosecute
crimes indicate the extent to which Lebanese institutions are incapable of administering justice.

AbuSaba, Mary Bentley. "Planning for Justice in South Lebanon." 

Peace Review
12, no. 1 (2000),
44; Dagher,
Bring Down the Walls, 
138.
142
ICTJ, “Failing to Deal with the Past,” 15.
143
Humphrey, Michael. "The special tribunal for Lebanon: emergency law, trauma and justice." 

Arab Studies
Quarterly
(2011), 
17.
144
“The Ta’if Agreement.” Accessed through 
United Nations 
online records.
145
The agreement also called for abolishing the requirement to include sect and denomination on identity cards. The

Lebanese Parliament did this in 2009, but due to the weakness of civil codes, the Lebanese state does not know how
to adjudicate personal status issues— such as marriage—without referring to religious courts. Dagher, 
Bring Down
the Walls, 
22.
146
Picard, 
Lebanon, a Shattered Country
70.
141

Ebert 30
147

However, elites repeatedly adhere to Confessionalism and amnesia as a way to avoid

addressing the actual issues of disunity.148 Unsurprisingly, the failure to acknowledge issues
continually reinjures an already devastated population. Michael Humphrey addresses the impacts
of silence on the community,
“In Lebanon, the phantom is the collective trauma imposed on the population by
the elite solution of amnesty and amnesia to chronic political crisis. Political peace
has been constantly bought by confessional pacts between political elites,
autoimpunity, forgetting and rendering victims invisible...The misrecognition is
sedimented in the amnesia of the layers of violence on which peace is constantly
reconstituted. The political landscape is generationally haunted by the victims of
past violence for whom noone has been held accountable and whose anxieties and
grief reinforce communal victimhood and grievance.”149
This amnesia covers all sources of disunity, not just the civil war. For example, the Doha
Agreement reasserted the Confessional system following a series of riots in 2008.150 Any
reforms, such as majority rule, are staunchly resisted over fears that subjecting a society
resembling a “ethnoreligious kaleidoscope” to reforms will result in another war.151 Thus, elites
maintain Confessionalism to guarantee their own personal power, but justify it under the “logic
of saving citizens from something more catastrophic.”152 However, the impunity permeating
Lebanese society prohibits rule of law and furthers the injustices experienced by citizens.
Lebanese institutions are at the center of the state’s avoidance of rule of law. Thus, Somalia’s
absence of formal institutions following the civil war present a unique corollary to Lebanon’s
case.
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Somalia
Somalia supports the Lebanese conclusion that topdown imposition of order through
institutions disconnected from society hinder the realization of justice and prevent the rule of
law. However, Somalia, since the collapse of its government, has served as an arena ripe for
Hayek’s spontaneous experiments with legality unhindered by institutions. Somali institutions
have been capable of supporting the rule of law because they are established by the general
populace and based on widely held religious values. This section will juxtapose the failures of
orthodox institutions with the successes of informal initiatives to highlight the importance of
institutional congruence.
Similar to Lebanon, newly established central governments in Somalia have failed to
capture control or legitimacy because they do not match social consensus. Since 1991, Somalia
has had three central governments: the Transitional National Government (TNG) (20002004),
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (20042012)
,
and the current government
154
(2012present), recognized by the US State Department on January 17, 2013.153,
However,

these “inorganic” governments avoid widespread support from a populace deeply distrustful of
156
central government due to colonial manipulation and Siad Barre’s predation. 155,
Established

outside Somalia, these governments failed to offer any order among violent militias and not only
did the public not view them as legitimate, they were increasingly hostile to their claimed
authority.157 Like the postwar Lebanese government, the TFG avoided reconciliation because it
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is too divisive in the warweary society and thus avoided all legitimacy.158 Without being
entrenched within the social consensus, these governments are viewed as vehicles for power,
rather than social good.159 Thus, politics is viewed as a zerosum game able to provide an edge to
rival clans.160 Furthermore, the current government structure is consociational—based on
proportional clan representation—and thus the discussion about the perils of Lebanese
Confessionalism offer warnings for the future of Somali politics. 161 The current government has
already wavered; President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has delayed popular presidential elections
in 2016 stating he does not “want the election to create new conflict, new division, within the
society….Somalia is still fragile.”162 While the election is still scheduled, the next president will
be chosen by a group of 135 clan elders.163 Suspending a popular vote on the basis of security
and unity concerns harkens back to the discussion on Lebanese elite control for the purpose of
stability.
Although the current Somali government parallels the challenges facing Lebanon,
Somalia is able to transcend decay through the bottomup construction of institutions. Between
1991 and when the TNG was established in 2000, Somalia was run by warlords and is frequently
characterized as a Hobbesian state of nature. However, beginning in 1993, local militias
established Shari’a courts.164 Although these courts controlled only a “few city blocks,” they
were widely supported by a population tired of violence and disorder. 165 Though these courts
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were organized along clan identities and had their own militias, they were praised for their
“discipline and good conduct.”166 Noah Feldman, acknowledging the challenges of these courts,
states,
“Nevertheless, the Islamic courts had a set of special advantages for the task of
combating disorder. First, because most Somalis are Muslim, they would probably
have expected that the substantive rulings of the courts would be fair and just.
Second, the scholars—few and poorly trained though they might be—still possessed
enough residual respect and authority as interpreters of the law that they were able
to constitute these courts under the most difficult conditions imaginable, and at
considerable personal risk.”167
These courts offered noticeable improvements in security within their communities, allowing
people to “walk the streets without fear” for the first time since 1991.168 The success of these
courts can be attributed to their articulation and commitment to Islamic ideals that unite Somalis.
Furthermore, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), created in 2004, unified independent
courts and began institutionalizing these norms providing law and order.169 
The Supreme Council
of the ICU functioned like a parliament and “sort[ed] out any problems in outlying courts, [kept]
all the programs in line, and [made] sure everyone is reading from the same script.”170 The ICU
represents the most successful form of justice and governance in Somalia to date and supports
the bottomup theory of rule of law because “there is no legislature that passes laws. Instead, law
is ‘discovered’ through the dispute resolution process. Indeed, it’s not entirely unlike the early
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English common law system that [the US] legal system evolved from.”171 Unfortunately, with
help from the US and Ethiopia, the ICU was defeated in 2006 by the TFG.172
The ICU puts topdown and bottomup institutions directly in conversation. The ICU was
the result of spontaneous calls for order in wartorn Somalia, and thus the ICU—drawing on
common Islamic values as well as a unified warweariness—enjoyed wide public support. The
international intervention displacing the ICU represents an elite, topdown imposition of external
values, and mirrors the dysfunction of Lebanese institutions as the intervention was based on
personal goals and denial of the actual reality of the situation. Essential to the defeat of the ICU
was the US fear of Islamic organizations. What follows is a brief discussion on Islamic
organizations in Lebanon and Somalia in relation to the international community.

Top Down Imposition: International Perceptions of Fundamentalism
Although this analysis focuses on domestic forces contributing to the realization or
avoidance of the rule of law, the conclusions drawn can be useful for informing international
perceptions on the efficacy of institutions in Lebanon and Somalia. The international community
generally fears the emergence of Islamic organizations such as the ICU, AlShabaab, and
Hezbollah, which are commonly equated because the West often conflates organizations
centered on Islamic values with terrorism. However, this perception is based on a failure to
acknowledge the actual workings of these groups. The ICU, AlShabaab, and Hezbollah function
disparately within their societies and deserve discussion.
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The failure to differentiate between Islam and terrorism led to the destruction of the ICU
and the most promising opportunity for unifying Somalia under a central authority. The US was
involved in efforts to promote the rule of law in Somalia but clung to its orthodox perception of
174
legal institutions and failed to recognize the successes of the ICU.173,
Consequently, the US

supported Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion of Somalia to oust the ICU from power.175 This was a
mistake that, unfortunately, is likely to be repeated again without a nuanced understanding of the
cultures within which these organizations operate. It is important to make clear the difference
between AlShabaab and the ICU. 
In contrast to the ICU, which, as previously discussed, offered
stability and rule of law to Somalia, AlShabaab is a terrorist organization with ties to AlQaeda.
176

AlShabaab explicitly advocates for the establishment of an Islamic state and implements

strict Shari’a rule in the territories it controls.177 While this can be used as evidence of the
radicalization of the Somali people, most Somalis do not support radical Islam and oppose
179
stricter elements of Shari’a law.178 ,
The forceful recruitment of local Somalis in comparison to

the voluntary recruitment of diaspora Somalis speaks to the lack of support for terrorism.180
AlShabaab is a topdown imposition of order that is not rooted within national consensus.
However, US labels of terrorism do not perfectly characterize organizations as evidenced by
Hezbollah.
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The US State Department lists Hezbollah, like AlShabaab, as a terrorist organization.181
However, Hezbollah more closely resembles the ICU as it serves to unite Lebanese across sects.
Hezbollah gained initial support through its provision of welfare and services the national
government fails to provide.182 Additionally, Lebanese of all religions demonstrated national
solidarity with Hezbollah’s resistance to 
Israel’s invasion during the civil war.183 
Although
Hezbollah is explicitly a Shi’a organization, it has expanded its membership to include other
sects.184 Sheikh Naim Kassem, the Vice General Secretary of Hezbollah says, “We believe in
Islam, but we will not impose Islam on anybody else. We do not consider that there is a
fundamental conflict between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon. We want to build bridges of
understanding and cooperation with the Christians.”185 Furthermore, Hezbollah’s inclusion in the
national government has marginally increased the government’s legitimacy because Hezbollah is
“disciplined, solidly in command…reputedly honest, and devoted to the public welfare.”186 Thus,
Hezbollah represents an institution that crosses sectarian divides and can possibly be the vehicle
toward a more unified public consensus.
Without advocating any policies, this analysis provides a useful framework for
determining possible responses to terrorism. The importance of understanding the cultural
significance of organizations is not only important to avoid inciting antiAmerican sentiment, it
is also important for the longevity of justice within a community.
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Conclusion
This paper, situated within broader discussion of the origin of the rule of law, has
presented a comparative analysis of two states’ differing trajectories of the rule of law. Although
vastly different states, Lebanon and Somalia faced similar environments for rebuilding rules of
law. Each state faced the challenge of establishing a common conception of justice in the context
of historical divisions of identity made ever more pervasive by completely atrocious civil wars.
The ability for Somalia to foster a common consensus and create congruent institutions speaks to
the success of bottomup creation of legality rooted in citizens’ needs. In contrast, Lebanon
provides warning for the detrimental impacts of elite control of institutions and the failure to
reconcile injustices committed along communitarian divides.
In keeping true to Kahn’s method of the cultural study of law separate from its practice,
this paper makes no policy recommendations. However, this analysis is situated within a massive
gap in current rule of law literature. This discussion prompts further research into other rules of
law. Especially interesting would be an analysis of two states with plural religious identities to
study how states could articulate a consensus absent a unifying religious code. This study could
also expand to include indepth analyses of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of international
organizations, which can help improve the efficacy of the currently moribund success of rule of
law promotion.
If nothing else, this paper has established that the existence of procedural law, without an
accompanying social consensus, does not foster the rule of law. Furthermore, seeking stability
over reconciliation in postwar environments destroys institutional legitimacy and perpetuates
the injuries of the war atrocities. Years after the end of the war, Lebanese officials admitted
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“they had botched the end of the war and that no politician had spoken the language of courage
and effort or risen above the fray of special interests.”187 So, while amnesia may be expedient in
the shortterm, the lasting longevity of justice requires deliberate and painful discussions on
atrocities and identity. Rule of law does require elites to prioritize communal justice over
personal power. Furthermore, however ruthless a crisis may be, Somalia demonstrates that
citizens, without hindrance from unresponsive institutions, will not succumb to a Hobbesian state
of nature, but will cooperate to restore order, trust, and justice.
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